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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
PEGGY BEZNER, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-vs-
CONTINENTAL DRY CLEANERS, 
INC., a Corporation, and 
BERT HARRY, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
Case No. 14119 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
In accordance with Rule 75(p)(l) and (2) Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, the appellants submit the following in reply to respondent's 
brief on appeal. 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL OOURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO AWARD RESPONDENT 
GREATER DAMAGES THAN IT AWARDED SINCE RESPONDENT FAILED TO 
MEET HER BURDEN OF PROOF THAT SHE WAS ENTITLED TO A GREATER 
AWARD. 
In Point III of Respondent's Brief, respondent raises the 
contention that trial court erred in allowing $3,719.00 to defendants 
as reasonable rental for the equipment under the contract which was 
attached to respondent's complaint as Exhibit A. The court made no 
such award or finding. The judgment on the verdict (R. 31) merely 
recites that respondent is entitled to damages on her claim for 
rescission in the sum of $9,600 plus $1,070 interest. 
An examination of respondent's amended complaint shows that 
the prayer in respondent's complaint requested rescission of the 
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contract between plaintiff and defendant being Exhibit A and 
restitution of plaintiff to all sums paid under said contract 
being approximately $12,000. The basis of the respondent's 
first cause of action was that the execution of the contract 
Exhibit A for the sale of In-And-Out Dry Cleaners to respondent 
was a fraudulent representation by appellant. Respondent _... 
acknowledges that under Erisman v. Overman, 11 Utah 258, 358 P.2d 85 
(1961) that appellants would be entitled to some consideration 
for the use of the equipment during the time that respondent 
was in possession. In the Erisman case, the court denied 
rescission where the plaintiff sat on her rights for a period 
of approximately a year and recognized that plaintiff had a 
legitimate claim under the contract for the benefit conferred on 
the defendant. In this case, since the respondent put a cause of 
action in fraud, respondent had the burden of proving the fraud 
and the damages which arose as a result of the fraud. The contract 
in question provided in Paragraph 2 (R. 144) for a $10,000 initial 
payment in two payments with a balance of $30,000 being paid in 
equal monthly installments over a ten-year period. Respondent 
paid the equal monthly installments for all but the last two 
months of which she was in possession being a little over $300 
per month. The general rule as to the burden of proof as to 
damages is set forth in 22 Am. Jur. 2d., Damages, § 296, where 
it is stated: 
tTAs a rule, the burden of proof is upon the 
plaintiff to show the fact and extent of the 
injury and to show the amount and value of 
his damages, whether the action is a breach 
of contract or for tort." 
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In 37 Am. Jur. 2d., Fraud and Deceit, § 449, it is observed: 
"The burden of proof of injury sustained 
through reliance upon a false representation 
rests upon the party who alleges fraud. He 
must prove that he has suffered a loss or has 
been prejudiced by the fraud to the extent 
requisite to warrant the grant of the relief 
which he seeks. Thus, it is incumbent upon 
one seeking to rescind a contract for fraud 
to prove whatever element of injury from the 
fraud is requisite to the relief sought. 
Damage or prejudice from fraud is not ordinarily 
presumed. Hence, one seeking to recover damages 
for fraud in a law action must prove that he has 
suffered a loss directly from, and as a clear 
and necessary consequence of, the fraud to an 
extent so definite and ascertainable that an 
award providing for the payment to him of a 
sum properly compensating him for the fraud 
practiced upon him, or granting him adequate 
relief by way of recoupment or cross complaint, 
may be made. 
"The plaintiff must prove the extent of the 
damages he contends resulted from the fraud; 
and where he alleges that he sustained a loss 
therefrom, he must prove the method by which"" 
he suffered the loss. To justify the appli-
cation of either the Tbenefit of the bargainT 
or the Tout of pocketT measure of damages, 
the complainant must prove the actual value 
of the property purchased, at the time of 
purchase. Also, in order to have damages 
measured by the benefit of the bargain, or 
by the amount required to make a representa-
tion good, the party seeking damages for a 
false representation concerning property sold 
to, or received in exchange by,him, must 
produce evidence of what the property would 
have been worth if it had been as represented." 
(Emphasis added.) 
In Pace v. Parrish, 122 Utah 141, 247 P.2d 273 (1952), this Court 
stated with reference to prior Utah cases that "measure of damages 
for fraud is a difference between value of property purchased and 
the value it would have had if the representations were true." 
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In Dilworth v. Lauritzen, 18 Utah 2d 386, 424 P.2d 136 (1967), the 
court noted that "Utah follows the majority rule which is the 
difference between the actual value of what he received and the 
value thereof if it had been as represented." In Lamb v. Bangart, 
525 P.2d 602 (Utah 1974), the same standard was reiterated by the 
Court. Therefore, it was respondent's burden to prove the measure 
of the damages to which she was entitled on rescission. 
Respondent had the burden of proving that the value of the 
equipment which she possessed for approximately nine months 
during which time she paid a sum of a little over $300 a month 
was not equal to the benefit conferred but was less than the 
money she had actually paid out during that time. The record is 
silent as to any evidence from the plaintiff that the possessory 
value of the equipment held and used during the period in which 
she was in occupancy was not equal to the sum paid during that 
time especially considering that for two months of her occupancy, 
she failed to make equipment payments. 
The instant case is not unlike that recently decided by 
the Court in Wagstaff v. Remco, 540 P.2d 931 (Utah 1975). In 
that case, this Court approved the trial court's action of 
allowing a general contractor who had frustrated a subcontractor's 
performance of a contract the amount of expenses reasonable and 
necessary to complete the job. In the instant case, the trial 
court simply entered judgment for the respondent-plaintiff for 
the amount of damages proved but where respondent-plaintiff did 
not prove that the value of the possessory interest in the 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-5-
equipment possessed was less than the money paid during the time 
of the possession there was no right to recover additional damages* 
The burden of proving damages was on respondent and the evidence 
supports the conclusion of the trial court that no greater damages 
than those awarded was in fact proved by respondent; 
POINT II 
RESPONDENT'S CROSS APPEAL CONTENTION AS TO APPELLANTS 
BREACH OF THE LEASE AGREEMENT WAS NOT PROPERLY PRE-
SERVED FOR APPELLATE CONSIDERATION AND IS OTHERWISE 
WITHOUT MERIT. 
Rule 74(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure governs 
cross appeals and provides that the party desiring to cross appeal 
"shall file a statement of points on which he intends to rely on 
such cross appeal" within the time provided by Rule 75(d) URCP. 
Rule 75(d) URCP provides that a statement of points on cross appeal 
shall be filed within ten days after service and filing of appellant's 
designation. On the instant case, the designation of record on 
appeal was filed on June 17, 1975. On June 23, 1975, respondent 
filed a cross appeal and statement of points. No statement of 
point was contained in the cross appeal relating to the refusal 
of the trial court to submit the factual question of breach of the 
lease Exhibit B (R. 146) to the jury (R. 4). Thereafter, an amended 
cross appeal was filed on June 26, 1975. The amended cross appeal 
purported to incorporate as a statement on appeal the contention 
raised in Point IV of respondent's brief. The appellants contend 
that since neither Rule 74(b) or 75(d) nor Rule 15 of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure sanction amended cross appeals that no amended 
cross appeal may be filed after the statement of points on an 
original cross appeal has in fact been filed. Rule 15(a) provides 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-6-
in part: "Otherwise a party may amend his pleading only by leave 
of court or by written consent of the adverse party . . ." In 
the instant case, consent of appellant was not obtained before 
amendment nor was leave of court obtained. Consequently, it is 
submitted that the contention raised in Point IV of respondent's 
brief has not properly been preserved on appeal. 
The respondent contends in Point IV of her brief "that the 
rescission of the contract for purchase of fraud warrants a res-
cission and cancellation of the lease in that they were inter-
dependent." (Respondent's Brief, p. 27). An examination of the 
pleadings in the instant case reveal that in respondent's amended 
complaint, second cause of action, she contended that appellants 
breached their lease agreement (Exhibit B) (R. 166). In her 
prayer, respondent asked for judgment against the defendants 
for the sum of $300 for damages occasioned to the respondent 
by reason of breach of the lease agreement (R. 141, 142). There 
was no request made by respondent for rescission. Consequently, 
any claim for rescission is raised the first time on appeal. It 
is well settled law in the State of Utah that a theory of recovery 
not submitted to the trial court cannot be considered for the 
first time on appeal. General Appliance Corporation v. Haw, Inc., 
30 Utah 2d 238, 516 P.2d 346 (1973); Clegg v. Lee, 30 Utah 2d 242, 
516 P.2d 348 (1973). Consequently, any contention of the res-
pondent's that the lease Exhibit B was interdependent with the 
rescission cause of action relating to Exhibit A is not properly 
before the court. 
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Further, it should be noted that in the final contention 
in Point IV, respondent requests the court reverse the lower 
court and enter judgment in favor of respondent in the sum of 
$350. If respondent's amended cross appeal is properly before 
the court it is limited by the issue framed in Paragraph 3 that 
the trial court erred in "refusing to submit" the issue to the 
jury. Consequently, the request for relief in Point IV of 
respondent's brief is outside the scope of the preserved issue 
on appeal. Further, it is worth noting on this point that the 
respondent's brief on Page 26 asks for judgment in the sum of 
$350 whereas on Page 22 of respondent's brief, respondent 
indicates that the evidence from respondent indicated that the 
damages were only $330. Further, respondent's amended complaint 
asked for only $300 in damages and respondent's requested instruction 
No. 27 (R. 72) asks for damages in the sum of $297.50. It is apparent 
from this jumbled approach to this issue that respondent has not 
cautiously and analytically treated the issue and it is without 
merit. 
The trial court refused to submit the issue of breach of 
lease Exhibit B (R. 146) because the trial court concluded there 
was no factual conflict in need of jury resolution. An examination 
of Exhibit B (R. 146) discloses that in the 5th paragraph, respondent 
agreed to the following circumstances: 
"The said parties of the second part accept this 
Lease and the premises described therein in the 
condition and state of repair they are now in, 
and agree to occupy the same in a lawful manner 
and will keep the water pipes and their connections, 
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sewage pipes and their connections, upon 
said premises, at all times, in good condition 
and state of repair . . . ." (Emphasis added). 
In the 6th paragraph, respondent agreed to the following additional 
terms: 
"That the party of the first part shall not be 
liable for any damage occasioned by failure 
to keep said premises in repair and shall not 
be liable for any damage done or occasioned 
by or from plumbing, gas, water, steam or 
other pipes or sewage, or the bursting, 
leaking, or running of any washstand, tank, 
water closet or waste pipe in above, upon, 
or about said building or premises, nor from 
damage occasioned by water arising from acts 
or neglect or co-tenants or other occupants 
of the same building." (Emphasis added). 
Respondent now contends that since the 13th paragraph of the contract 
required appellant to keep the premises and exterior of the leased 
building in good condition and state of repair that there was a 
failure to comply with the terms of the lease. The factual evidence 
before the trial court failed to show that the premises were in any 
different condition as to state of repair on the day of the execution 
of Exhibit B than the day of the alleged water damage to the premises. 
Further, there is no evidence of record whatsoever to support a 
contention that the water damage sustained by respondent was the 
result of any defect in the exterior portion of the premises or 
building. The evidence at the time of trial clearly indicated 
that any damage that may have been caused was the result of a 
drain pipe backing up, freezing and water spilling over into the 
area damaged. (T. 363, 381, 360, 205-207, 226). Further, Paragraph 
six of the lease expressly excludes the appellants from liability 
for damage occasioned by water. Thus, it is clearly apparent that 
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Paragraphs 5 and 6 of Exhibit B as interpreted by the trial court 
precluded submissions of the issue to the jury as there was no 
factual basis left in dispute that warranted jury consideration. 
Point IV of respondent's brief therefore is unmeritorious and respondent 
should take nothing by way of cross appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
It is apparent from an examination of the respondent's claims 
on cross appeal that respondent's position is one of complaining 
about her own failure to submit credible evidence sufficient to 
sustain her contentions. The trial court carefully considered 
the issues raised by the matters before this Court in respondent's 
cross appeal and found them unmeritorious. Respondent's cross 
appeal should afford respondent no relief and the case should be 
reversed on the basis of the contentions set forth in appellant's 
brief and either dismissed or a new trial awarded. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JOHN B. ANDERSON 
610 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Attorney for Appellants 
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